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Transforming conflicts from the bottom-up? Reflections on civil society
efforts to empower marginalized fishers in postwar Sri Lanka
Joeri Scholtens 1 and Maarten Bavinck 1,2
ABSTRACT. We analyze the efforts of an international consortium of academics and activists to understand and address a transnational
fisheries conflict in South Asia. The so-called REINCORPFISH project (2010–2016) focused on an asymmetrical conflict between
trawler fishers from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu who frequently transgress into Sri Lankan waters and northern Sri Lankan fishers,
whose livelihoods are affected by these intrusions as well as by a long history of civil war. Guided by notions of bottom-up governance
and empowerment, the consortium engaged in action research focusing on three types of remedial activities: (a) facilitating dialogues
between fishers from both countries, (b) supporting the creation of a unified fisher organization in northern Sri Lanka, and (c) engaging
in an advocacy program promoting assistance for the northern Sri Lankan fishers. Although the consortium succeeded in creating
widespread attention of the problem, we analyze how the project’s rationale of bottom-up governance was thoroughly challenged by
divisive national and transboundary politics. The fisheries conflict intertwined with geopolitical power play, military bluster, and ethnic
tension, as well as with governmental suspicion toward NGO activity of any kind, marginalized civil society and compromised its
assumed role as an agent of change. We therefore demonstrate how supporting marginalized resource users through action research
requires handling a multiplicity of coexisting conflicts (resource, ethnic, and geopolitical) and that studying or dealing with such
conflicts in isolation is both conceptually and practically flawed.
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INTRODUCTION
Development studies entail the analysis of social change as well
as the pursuit of directed progress. In a stereotypical way, the first
is the domain of the scientist who critically describes and reflects;
the second is the domain of the practitioner, who is in possession
of forward-looking, professional optimism (Lund 2010). These
two domains, however, do not operate in isolation; they are
conceptually and empirically blurred and influenced by each
other.  
In the spirit of overcoming the presumed duality of science and
practice and facilitating transdisciplinary engagement with
conflicts over natural resources, the Netherlands Organisation for
Scientific Research (NWO), together with the Netherlands
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, funded an innovative program that
was geared toward addressing conflict and cooperation over
natural resources (CoCooN) in various parts of the world (Frerks
et al. 2014). As part of this program, it happened that one year
after the end of the Sri Lankan civil war (2009), a consortium of
Dutch, Indian, and Sri Lankan universities and NGOs, including
the two authors of this paper, commenced an action research
project with the acronym REINCORPFISH.  
This research-cum-action project aimed to understand and
address a protracted transboundary fishing conflict in the Palk
Bay, which is a secluded marine area of approximately 12,000 km²
between India and Sri Lanka. Trawl fishers from the Indian state
of Tamil Nadu were illegally frequenting northern Sri Lankan
fishing grounds in large numbers, and by doing so, compromised
the fishing opportunities for a large population of Sri Lankan
small-scale fishers, preventing their recovery from the effects of
the brutal civil war.  
The consortium’s objective was to address this transboundary
resource conflict by working from the bottom-up on both sides
of the Palk Bay and thereby to “facilitate the development and
implementation of a new framework for the regulation of
fisheries” (REINCORPFISH 2010, unpublished report). On the
Sri Lankan side, the consortium strove to advance its objective
by empowering northern Sri Lankan fishers in their interactions
with Indian fishers as well as with the Sri Lankan authorities. The
central purpose of this article is to understand and reflect on the
challenges of this international civil society-based initiative to
transform a transboundary fishing conflict from the bottom-up.
Theoretically, we draw on literature concerning bottom-up
governance, empowerment, and civic-driven change (Fowler and
Biekart 2013). Our focus is on the process as it unfolded on the
Sri Lankan side of the Bay, largely leaving aside its
accomplishments in India, which have been discussed elsewhere
(Stephen 2015, Menon et al. 2016). This article thus makes a
contribution as a piece of action research in the context of postwar
construction, teasing out conceptual and practical insights by
reflecting on the challenges encountered by the transdisciplinary
consortium of NGOs and academics aiming to transform the
fisheries conflict.
THEORETICAL INROADS
The following conceptualizations of empowerment, bottom-up
governance and civil society serve a twin purpose. First, they
provide a conceptual background to the rationale of the project’s
interventions; second, they offer material for reflection on some
of the project’s accomplishments and challenges. In this sense, we
position ourselves as project holders while simultaneously
claiming a capacity to reflect on the project as relative outsiders.
Bottom-up governance and empowerment
Following disappointment with decades of state-based, top-down
models of fisheries management, as well as increasing concerns
over declining fish stocks and crises of institutional legitimacy,
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an extensive body of knowledge on fisheries governance has
emerged since the 1980s. The resulting conceptualization of
governance has both analytical and normative dimensions: “[G]
overnance is both what is and what should be, both reality and
potential” (Kooiman and Bavinck 2005:16). Analytically,
governance proceeds from the observation that a plethora of
actors other than the state takes part in steering society (Kooiman
et al. 2005). Normatively, the concept suggests that “the solution
to many present day challenges does not rest with government
alone but must also involve other sectors of society”
(Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2009:111) and proposes a view “of
governance as a space of interaction, collaboration, deliberation
and problem solving” (Sowman and Wynberg 2014:8).  
The governance paradigm has inspired the promotion of new
fisheries management models, suggesting the active involvement
of user groups in the formulation, implementation, and
monitoring of institutions. The underlying rationale is that
involving users in the formulation and implementation of
regulations enhances the probability of their legitimacy, fairness,
compliance, and hence effectiveness (Jentoft 2004). Such thinking
has spurred the promotion of approaches with resounding titles
such as self-governance (Kooiman et al. 2005), community-based
governance (Ostrom 1990), participatory governance (Gray
2005), comanagement (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997, Jentoft 1989),
and bottom-up governance (Christie and White 2007, van Ginkel
2009). For the latter concept, which was the starting point of the
project, we use the generic definition by Rosenau and Czempiel
(1992:82): “Bottom up governance refers to policies that may be
ratified by governments but that are propelled and unfold mainly
outside the halls of government.”  
The notion of governance has faced ample criticism, amongst
others, for blurring the descriptive and the prescriptive and for
downplaying the power politics inherent in resource allocation
processes (Torfing et al. 2012, Scholtens 2016a). First, the focus
on the range of normative principles embedded in governance
has been criticized from the perspective that it becomes too much
like a recipe (Armitage 2007), leading to potential slippage from
understanding how governance works to normatively judging
how well it works (Mwangi and Wardell 2012). Second, the
emphasis on collaboration between state and nonstate actors
suggests that the state performs in a “morally and socially positive
manner” as a “benevolent patron of the public interest” (Davis
and Ruddle 2012:244). Davis and Ruddle (2012) go as far as to
suggest that notions of comanagement and participatory
governance constitute a “betrayal of small-scale fishers” for its
naïve endorsement of neoliberal state policies and for its neglect
of power abuse, wealth appropriation, and exploitation (Davis
and Ruddle 2012). Despite these critiques, there has been a strong
conviction among fisheries governance scholars that
participatory and collaborative forms of governance allow for the
alleviation of marginality and are instrumental in addressing
procedural injustices and empowering peripheral parties and
voices (Jentoft 2005, 2007).  
Because bottom-up governance assumes a certain capacity
among resource users and, where this capacity is lacking,
promotes its improvement, it is useful to examine the notion of
empowerment, with which capacity is often associated. Ideas of
empowerment lie at the heart of the alternative development
paradigm (Friedmann 1992). Empowerment can be understood
as a process or an outcome and as either a goal in itself  or rather
valued instrumentally for achieving other ends (Jentoft 2005). In
this article, we understand empowerment as a process of
increasing capacities for achieving resource access, with access
defined as the ability to benefit from resources (Ribot and Peluso
2003). Improving resource access vis-à-vis others can occur
through changing rules and regulations, improving technology,
or realizing access to authorities or other elites (Ribot and Peluso
2003).  
To understand the nature of empowerment, Mohan and Stokke
(2000) make a useful distinction between revisionist neoliberal
and post-Marxist approaches. From the first perspective,
empowerment entails a harmonious process of building bottom-
up, organizational structures through multistakeholder
deliberations. Here, empowerment has win-win potential, with
the assumption that bringing about positive change for marginal
groups can take place within existing power structures (Mohan
and Stokke 2000). The second perspective understands
empowerment as mobilization that challenges hegemonic
interests within the state and the market (Mohan and Stokke
2000). From this perspective, empowerment is a conflictive and
potentially zero-sum game that cannot occur without
disempowerment; “those who are being empowered are doing so
at someone’s expense” (Jentoft 2005:2). This perspective stresses
that marginalization is produced by adverse socio-political
interactions and that empowerment is, therefore, a relational
phenomenon.  
In terms of empowering resource users for gaining resource
access, the difference between these two approaches is significant.
A harmonious approach to empowerment may build institutional
capacity, negotiate collective outcomes with competing resource
users, and generate capacity for potential lobbying. A
confrontational approach may instead entail collective
mobilization for public protest, confronting exclusion, and
challenging rights and discourses that privilege dominant
resource users (Fowler and Biekart 2013).
Civil society as an agent of change
Processes of bottom-up governance and empowerment assume
notable roles for grassroots groups, NGOs, and other nonstate
actors. In the lexicon of international development, civil society
has been used both to describe an array of nonstate actors acting
as efficient “agent[s] for a participatory and empowering form of
development,” where the state does not deliver, but also as
representing the “bases of a counter-hegemonic bloc of social
forces engaged in a process of contesting the state” (Veltmeyer
2009:222). In this paper, we use the term civil society primarily to
refer to the consortium of local and foreign universities and
NGOs that was expected to play a joint role in transforming the
Palk Bay conflict while also broadening the term to include
fishers’ organizations, the media, and the clergy.  
What then was presumed to be the role of civil society in
empowering marginalized groups, in this case, northern Sri
Lankan fishers, for obtaining access to natural resources?
Kelleher and Taulbee (2017) provide a useful entry point, arguing
that, in the context of transboundary conflicts, a strong civil
society potentially allows for facilitating creative and informal
“track II” diplomacy that cuts through the red tape of
conventional interstate diplomacy, i.e., track I.  
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Track II offers a ‘bottom up’ … approach in contrast to
the top down, mediated solutions often touted in the past.
In this process, NGOs who have become deeply embedded
in societies can act as facilitators and conduits, that is as
agents who make productive exchange among players
possible and who provide ‘ground truth’ to governments
and other interested parties. (Kelleher and Taulbee 2017:83) 
This approach seems to fit in the aforementioned revisionist
approach.  
Fowler and Biekart (2013) provide a more critical understanding
of civil society in their work on civic driven change (CDC). Civic
driven change entails citizen-driven approaches to social problem
solving and has a strong bottom-up orientation. To this end, the
authors propose empowerment through civic agency as a tool for
targeting disempowering structures. Fowler and Biekart (2013)
contend that the present civil society discourse has become too
depoliticized to provide a framework for meaningful change.
According to them, development cooperation as “currently
envisaged and applied is too seldom able to support endogenous
civic agency without undermining it”; development practices,
therefore, require “a better and more honest appreciation of
power and the limited role of outsiders” (Fowler and Biekart
2011:27). In this perspective, processes of change are not always
harmonious, and civic resistance is required to challenge
authority holders.  
Another critique of civil society-led interventions concerns the
limitations imposed by postwar and authoritarian contexts. In
repressive regimes, critical civil society organizations operating
outside patronage systems of the state need to be well networked
to deal with the risk involved (Loveman 1998). At a more
fundamental level, Paris (2004), in a critical account of
international peacebuilding interventions, warns of the
potentially damaging and destabilizing effects of promoting
participatory forms of governance in war-torn societies in the
absence of well-established domestic institutions.  
In sum, in the conceptualization of bottom-up governance,
empowerment, and the role of civil society, there are strains
between the institutionalist perspective focusing on building more
inclusive collaboration processes and a more radical perspective
emphasizing the primacy of the political. We will demonstrate
how these strains are not merely theoretical but may actually be
encountered in practice.
POLITICAL CONTOURS OF THE NORTHERN SRI
LANKAN FISHERS’ STRUGGLE
Sri Lanka’s postwar anxieties
In May 2009, Sri Lanka’s armed forces’ victory over the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eezham (LTTE) marked an uncertain
end to three decades of brutal civil warfare. The civil war between
Sri Lanka’s armed forces, answering to a Sinhalese-dominated
state, and the separatist Tamil guerrilla movement LTTE, caused
hundreds of thousands of casualties and massive disruption,
especially of Sri Lanka’s Northern Province, which borders the
Palk Bay. Although the victory of government forces in 2009
provided hopes for the possibility of reconciliation, the first
postwar period, which terminated with the election of a new
president in January 2015, is described as one of “oppressive
stability” (Wickramasinghe 2014). The ruling coalition,
capitalizing electorally on the war victory, established a nepotistic
state characterized by chauvinist family rule. The military gained
a new role of safeguarding regime interests and controlling public
institutions, resulting in a culture of fear and impunity, in
particular in Tamil-majority areas (David 2013, Kumar 2013).
Meanwhile, a neoliberal growth and development agenda,
financed mostly through Chinese loans, resulted in the significant
physical reconstruction of war-affected regions. However, the
rural economy and associated livelihoods hardly received any
attention, leading to further economic marginalization and
indebtedness of an already war-traumatized population in
northern Sri Lanka (Kadirgamar 2013). Meanwhile, the tone of
postwar, nationalist Tamil politics suppressed the possibility of
public deliberation on the violent history of the LTTE and the
day-to-day socioeconomic struggles of Tamils throughout the
war (Hoole and Arulingam 2015).  
The postwar accusations of war crimes generated a powerful
UNHRC-led human rights investigation, which called upon the
Sri Lankan government to initiate a thorough investigation and
reconciliation process. The Sri Lankan government, however,
responded defensively to what it argued to be an intrusive and
hypocritical Western human rights agenda that interfered with
Sri Lankan sovereign affairs. In the process, local and
international NGOs in Sri Lanka received threats,
counterallegations, and public embarrassments. According to
Wickramasinghe (2014:408), this period was, for NGOs and
citizens, a time of “total compliance or desperate revolt.”  
On the other side of the Palk Bay, in the neighboring Indian state
of Tamil Nadu, anti-Sri Lanka rhetoric had become an important
constituent of daily politics. In 2011, the Tamil Nadu Assembly
even adopted a resolution declaring Sri Lanka to be an enemy
state (Scholtens et al. 2013). The Central Government of India,
which had a history of interference in Sri Lankan affairs
(including military intervention from 1987 to 1990), pressured Sri
Lanka to implement a political devolution program and voted
twice in support of the UNHRC resolution against Sri Lanka. It
is in this charged political context that the struggle of northern
Sri Lankan fishers needs to be interpreted.
Layers of northern Sri Lankan fishers’ marginality
By 2014, in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province, 40,000 fishers were
operating approximately 12,000 small-scale fishing craft (three to
six meters) in combination with a wide range of passive gear, such
as gills nets and drift nets (MFARD 2015). Fishing in this region
has traditionally been a caste-based occupation and is one of the
major sources of livelihood, with an estimated 25% of the
population of the Northern Province being dependent on the
sector (for a detailed account of northern Sri Lankan fisheries,
see Scholtens 2016a). The current predicament of the fishing
population is the result of multiple interlinked processes of
marginalization.  
During much of the civil war, fishing in northern Sri Lanka was
restricted by security forces in order to prevent LTTE guerrillas
from launching attacks from fishing boats (Scholtens 2016b).
Many fishing households were displaced multiple times, fleeing
from the continuously shifting frontlines. Postwar, after
restrictions were lifted and the small-scale fleet was partially
rebuilt, fishing had been severely compromised by a sizeable
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Indian trawl fleet that made use of the vacuum in Sri Lankan
waters to illegally frequent these rich fishing grounds (Fig. 1). The
Indian fleet consisted of approximately 1500 mid-size trawlers
with relatively powerful engines (< 192 hp) that completely
outsized the Sri Lankan craft. Sri Lankan fishers, operating small
craft and making use of passive fishing gear, had to avoid the
trawlers lest they run the risk of severely damaging their nets. The
trawler intrusions, therefore, resulted in not only harm to the
natural habitat but also damaged fishing gear, many days of
nonfishing, reduced incomes, and increased indebtedness
(Scholtens et al. 2012).
Fig. 1. Annual observations and arrests of Tamil Nadu trawlers
in Sri Lankan waters (Source: Sri Lankan Navy 2016,
unpublished data).
Prior to the start of the civil war, the Indo-Sri Lankan
International Maritime Boundary Line had been successfully
negotiated, with the bilateral agreements of 1974 and 1976 and a
subsequent exchange of letters between both governments
stipulating that both countries have exclusive fishing rights on
their respective sides of the boundary (Suryanarayan 2005,
Chandrahasan 2014). Despite the evident illegality of cross-
boundary trawl operations, the Sri Lankan Navy’s rate of
arresting Indian trawl fishers was remarkably low (see Fig. 1).
These Indian fishers had significant political support in Tamil
Nadu, where politicians were eager to take up the plight of “their
fishers” in order to capitalize on anti-Sinhala sentiments in their
constituencies (Scholtens et al. 2013). Hence, whenever the Sri
Lankan Navy arrested Indian trawl fishers, Tamil Nadu
politicians framed these arrests as a continuation of Sinhalese
violence against Tamils. Such arrests usually resulted in political
drama in which the Sri Lankan government eventually bowed to
Indian pressure, leading to the early release of the detained Indian
boats and fishers (Scholtens and Bavinck 2014). Because of the
limited political influence of northern Sri Lankan fishers, arrests
and releases of Indian fishers were also occasionally employed by
the Sri Lankan government as a pawn in its broader negotiations
with India. This political imbalance, which constitutes the second
layer of marginality, limited the Sri Lankan Navy to take more
decisive action against boundary transgressions.  
The third layer of marginality consisted of the fact that the
principal Tamil political party in Sri Lanka (the Tamil National
Alliance, or TNA) was reluctant to take on the cause of its fisher
constituency. One reason for this reluctance is the TNA’s historical
bias toward the Tamil land-owning caste (Kuganathan 2014). In
addition, the TNA seemed to believe that it required support from
“big brother” Tamil Nadu to achieve its objectives of political
devolution in Sri Lanka. Two local observers captured the
resulting orphaning of northern Sri Lankan fishers, as follows:  
The criminal nature of the Indian trawler enterprise and
the severe damages that it unleashed upon the resettled
northern Tamil fishing communities somehow escaped
Tamil nationalist attention-both here and abroad. While
the Indian fishers successfully lobbied the Tamil Nadu
and the central Indian governments to their aid, our
fishers were bereft of political agency as both the Tamil
leadership and the Sri Lankan government evaded
confrontation. (Hoole and Arulingam 2015:74) 
Tamil Sri Lankan fishers were thus unable to assert their rights
over adjacent waters because of a combination of technological
and political marginality. It was against this background that the
REINCORPFISH project commenced.
THE MAKING OF THE REINCORPFISH PROJECT
Actors, roles, and relations
The REINCORPFISH project was initiated in 2010 by the second
author of this paper, in collaboration with like-minded academics
and activists in India and Sri Lanka, with the first author
participating in the project as a PhD candidate. All participants
had a history of research or activism in South Asia’s fisheries
sector. The project built on earlier collaborations and also created
new linkages across Sri Lankan ethnic identities (Tamil and
Sinhala), countries (Sri Lanka, India, and the Netherlands), civil
society sectors (NGOs, universities, and the media), and academic
disciplines (marine ecologists, economists, geographers, and
anthropologists).  
On the Sri Lankan side of the project, the consortium included a
university in the Sinhala-dominated south and another in the
Tamil-dominated north, a Sri Lankan NGO for which we use the
pseudonym Sri Lankan Fishers Unity (SLFU), an Indian NGO
with a long history of engaging with the transboundary conflict,
an Indian university, and the University of Amsterdam. The
SLFU’s primary role was to pursue the project’s action agenda in
Sri Lanka. The SLFU had a history of fisher mobilization across
the country and pursued a rights-based approach. It enjoyed
considerable legitimacy among northern fishers, not in the least
for its successful island-wide mobilization of fishers during the
ceasefire period (2002–2006) to lobby for the removal of the harsh
fishing restrictions. The SLFU derived its funds from various,
mostly Western, donors and is closely connected with other rights-
based NGOs in the country. The Indian NGO liaised with the
SLFU and with the other partners to develop an appropriate
cross-country strategy. The Sri Lankan university partners
undertook parts of the research of REINCORPFISH, hosted
meetings and conferences on the fisheries struggle, and
occasionally joined the SLFU in its advocacy activities. Later on,
the consortium also developed links with local activists and
journalists who helped develop a media strategy.  
The University of Amsterdam team comprised the authors of
this paper. The second author has a long history of studying
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Table 1. Project activities and their rationales.
 
Project activities What Rationale
Transboundary fisher to fisher dialogues Facilitate negotiation through dialogues between
fisher groups from Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka.
Build on commonality of (Tamil) fisher groups
in Sri Lanka and India and facilitate process of
bottom-up governance of the transboundary
fishing space.
Organizing fisher leaders Bring fisher leaders from different northern Sri
Lankan districts together in one “Alliance.”
Building collective intentionality among fishers is
crucial for raising their profile and to engage in
public action.
Gaining government buy-in Inform, assist, and collaborate with government
in the development of a governance framework
and the resolution of fisher conflicts.
The Palk Bay fishing conflict cannot be resolved
without the commitment of both governments.
Advocacy for fishing rights Organizing conference, stakeholder meetings,
engaging media, and sensitizing Tamil and
Sinhala authorities.
Put the fisheries conflict, and the struggle of
north Sri Lankan fishers therein, higher on the
societal and political agenda.
Indian and Sri Lankan fisheries (e.g., Bavinck 2001, Bavinck
2005). As the project coordinator, he was responsible for adjusting
plans and keeping the project on an even keel. The first author
conducted 13 months of mixed methods fieldwork from 2011 to
2013, primarily in Jaffna District, which included three sets of
activities with relevance to this paper. First, by spending one
month in each of the three selected villages, he studied the impacts
of the Indian trawler activities and the functioning of local fisher
organizations. Second, he engaged extensively with the village and
district fisher leaders (83 open interviews), joining their meetings
at the village, district, and national levels whenever possible (16
district and national meetings). Finally, he regularly interacted
with the SLFU by joining their meetings with fisher leaders. The
first author thus had a double role of conducting research while
simultaneously participating in the project’s action agenda. This
double role entailed a balancing act inherent in action research.
In order to maintain impartial opportunity to discuss the project
with fisher leaders, he tried to maintain some distance from the
SLFU, for example, by avoiding taking on the role of intermediary
between fisher leaders and the SLFU.  
In the given geopolitical and postwar context, the positionality
of the two authors as white Europeans was also not trivial, and
implied being typically subjected to framings like “the NGO man
potentially bringing in resources,” or the “human rights activist
focused on revealing war crimes to the international community.”
Both views obviously influenced our access to fishers and
authorities and generated various suspicions, thus requiring
continuous explanations of our positions and interests.
REINCORPFISH rationale
Although the consortium partners had diverse backgrounds,
motives, and aspirations, they shared two points of departure.
First, the governance of the Palk Bay fisheries was in a crisis, and
an effective and fair governance and conflict transformation
process could only be achieved through the active involvement of
fishers from both sides. Second, after decades of war, northern
Sri Lankan fishers occupied marginal positions vis-à-vis Tamil
Nadu trawler fishers and their respective governments and
because of the asymmetrical nature of the prevailing conflict, they
required special support. The project imperative was, therefore,
“to develop a common governance framework between parties
… confirming the rights and responsibilities of small-scale fishing
populations” (REINCORPFISH 2010, unpublished report).
Although the Indian partners in REINCORPFISH focused on
understanding the logic of transboundary trawl fishing and
ultimately bringing this sector under control, the Sri Lankan
partners concentrated on promoting the collective agency of
small-scale fishers in the Northern Province. Over the course of
its five-year duration, in addition to supportive research, the
project engaged in four types of activity (see Table 1 and Fig. 2).
THE PROJECT IN PRACTICE: RATIONALE
CONFRONTED
Indo-Sri Lankan fisher dialogues
It was assumed that, because Tamil Nadu and northern Sri
Lankan fishers share a language, a profession, and an
ethnopolitical identity, there would be fertile ground for dialogue.
Finding its feet in the postwar setting, REINCORPFISH, by
means of the SLFU and the Indian NGO, supported a new set
of dialogue meetings that occurred in 2010 (Stephen et al. 2013),
an initiative that was met with cautious support from both
governments. On this occasion, the two groups of fishers reached
what looked like a promising agreement, stipulating that Indian
trawl fishers would terminate trawling after one year; during the
transition period, trawlers would be allowed to continue fishing
in a limited section of Sri Lankan waters for a total of 70 days
(see Stephen et al. 2013 for details). The REINCORPFISH
consortium viewed the 2010 dialogue as an upbeat start to the
project.  
The Sri Lankan government, however, soon made it known that
it had not been “appraised of the proposals that have been agreed
upon by two fishing communities […] during the Chennai
meeting” and subsequently started to oppose the dialogue process.
The government accused the SLFU of hand-picking LTTE-
affiliated fisher delegates to suit its own political needs and of
buying into the logic of “sharing waters” with India, thus
undermining Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity. Fisher leaders in
northern Sri Lanka subsequently reported that they were warned
to no longer deal with the SLFU, and the Ministry of Fisheries
announced that, because the transboundary fishing conflict was
an issue for the two governments to solve, there would be no more
bilateral fisher dialogues and no role for third party involvement.  
The ferocity of the governmental backlash had several causes.
First, during the dialogue visit to Tamil Nadu, some Tamil Sri
Lankan delegates capitalized on the presence of an eager Tamil
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Fig. 2. REINCORPFISH’s suggested pathways to facilitate transformation in the Palk Bay fisheries
conflict.
audience to criticize the Sri Lankan government. Second, the
backlash reflected a larger tension between Sri Lankan authorities
and rights-based NGOs in Sri Lanka, among which is the SLFU,
who was considered a major “troublemaker.” Third, while the
dialogue organizers mostly viewed the issue from a livelihood and
fisheries management perspective, for the Sri Lankan
government, sovereignty and security were the primary framings.
In short, the promising transboundary dialogues had
inadvertently flamed a range of state anxieties.  
Ironically, because of the continuing stalemate over the fisheries
conflict in the following years, both governments started to take
their own initiatives for subsequent rounds of fisher dialogue. In
2011, the Sri Lankan government hosted a meeting between
fishers from both sides, which was primarily used to reprimand
Tamil Nadu trawler owners, and left no scope for negotiation.
The political establishment in Tamil Nadu subsequently blocked
any further fisher dialogues, from which it felt that it had little to
gain (Sathya Moorthy 2013). When the Sri Lankan government
significantly increased the number and duration of trawler arrests
in 2013 (Scholtens 2015), Tamil Nadu fishers started to push for
new negotiations through a hunger strike, leading to two new
dialogue meetings in 2014 (Table 2). Although these dialogues did
not lead to any concrete agreement, they were strategic in the sense
that they exposed the uncomfortable reality to Indian and Tamil
media that Tamil Nadu trawlers were causing major harm to their
“brothers” across Palk Bay. Although the REINCORPFISH
consortium had played a key role in putting the possibility of a
dialogue on the agenda, they had become mostly sidelined in these
follow-up dialogues.
Building the Northern Province Fisher People’s Alliance
Fisheries cooperatives have been considered as vital multipurpose
institutions in Sri Lankan fisheries since the country’s
independence (Amarasinghe and Bavinck 2011). At the inception
of the project, fisher leaders in the Northern Province spoke rather
wistfully of their cooperatives, which had emerged relatively
unscathed from the war but were now increasingly fragmented
and rapidly losing influence. In early 2011, the SLFU brought
together fisher representatives from northern Sri Lanka with the
aim of founding a strong umbrella organization for representing
their interests. This initiative was essentially a matter of
revitalizing an old province-wide union that had existed until the
1990s but collapsed during the war. The participants in this
meeting, although divided by political affiliation, caste, district
of origin, and fishing gear, concurred, believing that such an
organization would potentially increase their influence. At the
end of the meeting, the newly formed Northern Province Fisher
People’s Alliance (henceforth “the Alliance”) presented itself  to
the press and handed over a petition to push for the cessation of
trawling to the Indian High Commission in Colombo.  
During subsequent years, the Alliance, which was generally
facilitated by the SLFU, held meetings that led to the formulation
of a constitution and several letters and petitions to Indian and
Sri Lankan authorities. Yet, its leaders were obviously dragging
their feet, ignoring the SLFU’s suggestion to formalize the
organization and take charge, postponing meetings and canceling
planned demonstrations.  
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Initiated by NGOs with government observers
attending
Agreement that trawling is harmful and has eventually to be
stopped. Trawlers promise to avoid fishing within three nautical
miles from the Sri Lankan coast.
August 2010 Ramnad
and Chennai
Initiated by REINCORPFISH with
encouragement from both governments.
Trawling in Sri Lankan waters will be stopped in one year. In the
interim period, 70 days are stipulated when trawlers can cross
the border. Governments do not endorse agreement.
March 2011
Colombo
Sri Lankan government invites fisher
representatives from both countries for a
meeting.
Only preliminary discussions in tense environment. Were to be
followed up by a meeting in Chennai, which did not materialize.
January 2014
Chennai
Fisheries ministries take charge, after much
pressure on Tamil Nadu.
Sri Lankan fishers frame the conflict as a livelihood issue. Indian




Fisheries ministries take charge. Tamil Nadu fishers ask for more time to stop trawling. Sri
Lanka fishers harden their stand and do not wish to give more
time to Tamil Nadu fishers.
There are four reasons why the Alliance was unable and unwilling
to act as the mouthpiece of northern Sri Lankan fishermen. The
first reason was that of political interference. The Alliance was
built on the institutional logic of the fisheries cooperative system
and had drawn its institutional membership from the Fisheries
Cooperative Unions of the Northern Province. Yet in this postwar
period, the cooperative societies were increasingly undermined
(see Scholtens 2016b). Thus, the Ministry of Fisheries, for reasons
of its own, set up a new fisher organization in parallel with the
cooperatives: the Rural Fisheries Organizations. The leaders of
these new organizations enjoyed patronage from the Fisheries
Ministry and effectively pushed the cooperative fisher leaders
aside. The parallel organizational structures that thus came about
created considerable friction and divisions within the fisher
leadership. In addition, local politicians directly interfered in the
2012 elections of the Fisheries Cooperative Unions in the
Northern Province, ensuring that their own men attained office.
Arguing that this new group of cooperative officers rose only
through political patronage, the Alliance leadership refused to
include them in their organization. This act furthered the
Alliance’s oppositional identity while simultaneously reducing its
linkage with the cooperative system.  
The second reason was an emerging leadership crisis. The elderly
fisher leader who initially assumed the chair position and enjoyed
wide respect had passed away, leaving disagreements about who
might replace him. The men who took over lacked the legitimacy
of the erstwhile president, with fishers cynically remarking that
the Alliance’s primary reason of existence was to provide
leadership positions to those who had just lost their positions in
the cooperative elections. Thus, in Alliance meetings, most
attention was devoted to contentious internal matters, such as
local gear conflicts, local trawler operations, and privileges of
fishers from southern Sri Lanka. In addition, in reflection of
previous tensions, fisher leaders from Mannar District argued
that the leadership from Jaffna District was arrogant and too
frequently operated single-handedly. The leadership crisis
reached its climax in mid-2014 when the Alliance’s president was
allegedly forced by the authorities to publicly speak out against
plans for a major demonstration in Jaffna that would involve
fisher groups from the entire country.  
The third issue was the marginalization of the SLFU itself. In the
face of a regime that is intensely suspicious of NGOs and
collective action, and in possession of a ubiquitous military and
intelligence apparatus to instill fear, both the Alliance and the
SLFU had limited maneuvering space. Fishers were well aware
that organizations like the SLFU, especially when it was operating
in the north, were closely monitored by the Central Intelligence
Directorate and that any protest against the government would
be easily framed as a Western conspiracy (e.g., BBC Sinhala 2012).
Thus, the SLFU repeatedly urged the Alliance to assert itself, hold
demonstrations and demand attention for the northern fishers’
situation. Fisher leaders would typically nod in response and
sometimes plan demonstrations, but these were then called off  a
few days in advance. Rumors were also spread through the
newspapers that the SLFU was using the northern fishers as
pawns for the purpose of securing donor funding. The SLFU’s
precarious position in the country peaked in February 2012 when
the government was quick to accuse the SLFU of organizing a
protest against a fuel hike, which eventually forced the SLFU’s
director to flee the country. For fisher leaders, this situation
created difficult dilemmas, as is brought out in the following
statement:  
We have to achieve our goals not through opposition but
by going with the politics. But we need something strong
to hold on [to] and to climb up. Some army commander
or whatever, it has to be a Sinhalese. We don’t want to
oppose anyone; we just want our problem solved. We have
to reach out to the government. Going against the
government is useless, that is the position of our country
now, especially here in the north. This is the problem with
[the SLFU’s] approach. … The thing is that their
approach works very well in the south and they are doing
very important work, but this way doesn’t work in the
north. When we go to jail, nobody will look after us. Here,
there is no use of demonstrating against the government.
That’s why we didn’t want to do any of those
demonstrations suggested by them. But we also need the
SLFU. They are important to get the different [northern]
districts together. … We are also just tired of going
against the government. We have tried it with arms for
30 years. (Fisher leader from Jaffna District, 10 Nov. 2012) 
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Fourth, there was the problem of the SLFU’s broader agenda.
Rather than confining itself  to the issue of Indian trawler
intrusion, the SLFU aimed to take on a wider range of issues
faced by northern fishers. This agenda meant that the SLFU also
mobilized around politically sensitive issues of concern to fishers
such as land dispossessions, “High Security Zones,” the plight of
internally displaced persons, and the military patronage of
Sinhala migrant fishers. This multi-issue based approach created
strategic difficulties. For instance, when building momentum
against Indian trawlers, one inevitably requires support from the
Sri Lankan government. Yet, mobilizing around issues related to
militarization and citizenship implies confrontation with the Sri
Lankan government and is typically considered as requiring
Indian support. The politics of navigating alliances and
opponents, as came out in the multiplicity of the SLFU’s agenda,
created further internal strife and demobilization among the
fisher leadership. In sum, the combination of political
interference, militarization, internal strife, suspicion, and the lack
of single focus around which to build a movement made it
virtually impossible for the Alliance to flourish.
Achieving government buy-in
The consortium, taking the side of the northern Sri Lankan
fishers and confronting the Indian trawl fishers without focusing
on ethnic discrimination or human rights discourses that have
dominated most international involvement in Sri Lanka, initially
assumed that collaboration with the Sri Lankan state would be
relatively easy. However, this assumption soon proved to be
incorrect for reasons that have already been touched upon. The
political sensitivity of the project was already apparent during the
preparations for the first project workshop, which was hosted by
the University of Jaffna in January 2011. Indications were a police
inquiry into possible LTTE-connections of the Sinhala academic
representing the University of Ruhuna and a letter from the Sri
Lankan High Commission in New Delhi pointing out the risks
of having Indian participants present.  
Despite many efforts from the project side and the Netherlands
embassy to introduce the project coordinator to the Minister of
Fisheries and, in the words of a high Dutch official, “overcome
the anxieties generally caused by this kind of project,” such a
meeting was never realized. Instead, tensions increased after the
SLFU director, having received undefined threats to his life, fled
the country and the Netherlands Organization for Scientific
Research (NWO) requested the Minister of Fisheries to ensure
his safety. The academic representing the University of Ruhuna
was subsequently blacklisted, and Ministry officials were denied
permission by their superiors to attend the two conferences that
were initiated by the project on the Palk Bay fishing conflict. As
a result, almost no interaction came about between the
government and the project at an official level. The reasons for
this condition are complex and still partly obscure. Several
external factors seem to have played an important role, however,
including (1) The postwar government’s antagonism toward
Western interference in its affairs, fed by events at the UNHRC
council meetings in Geneva; (2) the postwar government’s
antipathy toward all NGO activity and the fisheries Minister’s
personal dislike of the SLFU; and (3) fear of a resurrection of
Tamil guerrilla activity and suspicion of all project activities in
the Northern Province, particularly if  the activities had an Indian
component. These factors were largely external to the project’s
strategy, as is suggested by the fact that they partly dissipated with
the change of government in 2015 (which is beyond the scope of
this paper). The difficulties faced, however, resulted in a revision
of the project’s strategy, placing more emphasis on advocacy.
Advocating fisher rights
To create awareness for the plight of northern Sri Lankan fishers
among a broader Sri Lankan audience, both the universities and
the SLFU tried to organize workshops and seminars in the north
and the south of the country and to inform and engage Sri Lankan
and Indian media. The hope was that such pressure would
encourage the Sri Lankan government to act more assertively
toward India on the fisheries issue, which otherwise figured too
easily as a pawn in bilateral negotiations.  
The advocacy program sought to reveal the injustices experienced
by northern Sri Lankan fishers, which required confronting a
powerful set of dominant discourses. These included the
following: (1) In Tamil Nadu, trawl fishers are seen as the main
victims in the conflict because of their arrests by the Sri Lankan
Navy; (2) From a Sinhalese nationalist perspective, the main
problem is a patronizing India interfering in national affairs and
breaching its sovereignty; and (3) From a Sri Lankan Tamil
nationalist perspective, any challenge to the Tamil people is the
result of oppression by the Sri Lankan government.  
The anxieties surrounding the organizing of a national advocacy
workshop on the trawl issue at the northern university illustrate
the power of these discourses. First, as a local professor argued
in March 2012, the upcoming UNHRC voting round ensured that
Sri Lanka was in the international spotlight; the northern
university should, therefore, be reluctant to provide the
government any opportunity to internationally show off in a
“reconciliatory” light. Second, the professor argued that the
university staff  would also likely be suspicious of such a north-
south bridging workshop, as speaking out against trawlers would
imply confronting Tamil Nadu, which was found unacceptable in
the days close to the UNHRC voting; the Tamils on both sides of
the Palk Bay rather had to form a single front. Third, the internal
division among fisher leaders posed dilemmas. Not only was it
impossible to get all of the relevant leaders to a meeting of this
kind, internal disagreements that might be voiced before
government officials would cause unwanted embarrassment.
Fourth, it was feared that the meeting would attract attention
from intelligence agencies and government-affiliated politicians,
effectively securitizing the meeting and potentially bringing the
military to the university campus. Fifth, fishers felt that the caste-
based arrogance of most university staff, or any other elite, for
that matter, toward fishers made it unlikely that such a meeting
bore any real relevance for them.  
Hence, fisher leaders, clergy, and university staff  all hesitated to
endorse such an advocacy meeting, not only knowing that one
misstep could compromise their positions or lead to some form
of retaliation but also feeling that chances for success were limited.
This attitude may also be associated with a larger postwar social-
psychological lethargy in Jaffna (Somasundaram and Sivayokan
2013).  
Meanwhile, the SLFU, aiming to build a national fisher
movement, organized meetings throughout Sri Lanka, providing
fishers from various parts of the country a platform for speaking
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Table 3. Project activities and obstacles faced.
 
Element of bottom-up governance Element of empowerment Obstacles




Suspicion by Sri Lankan
government;
Governments’ unwillingness to back
up;
Tamil Nadu fishers’ lobby too
powerful;
Entanglement in bilateral politics.
Alliance building Build institutional capacity for
fishers as precondition for self- and/
or comanagement.
Creating a shared vocabulary,
asserting rights, and associating for
public action.
Internal frictions on strategy;
Political interference and inability to




Government buy-in Achieve recognition of the
problems’ urgency and the need to
involve fishers in a solution.
Striving to bring the Alliance into
the negotiating process
Unwillingness of the Sri Lankan
government to engage with NGOs;
Suspicion toward project’s motives;
Negative path dependency.
Advocacy Support fishers in voicing concerns. Challenging discourses and
mobilizing support.
Unbridgeable ethnic divide;
Lack of political space for
engagement;
Resistance from Tamil nationalist
agendas.
out. Although in the north these meetings were always surrounded
by security tensions, organizing meetings in Colombo proved
more feasible. In February 2013, the SLFU organized a large
meeting for fishers in Colombo, also attended by academics from
various universities, politicians, and clergy. Later, with the buy-in
from five Sri Lankan universities, the consortium organized a
Palk Bay fisheries conference in the capital in 2014, providing
renewed momentum. These meetings were arguably significant in
terms of sensitizing new audiences to the fisheries struggle and
enticed journalists to dive into and report on the livelihood
challenges faced by northern Sri Lankan fishers. Press coverage
on northern fisheries considerably increased over time, both in
quality and quantity.  
Finally, a major advocacy challenge was to break the silence of
the Tamil elite, in particular, the Northern Provincial Council and
the TNA. One TNA politician remarked:  
Though New Delhi has been committed to our cause, we
need Jayalalitha [Chief Minister Tamil Nadu] to
pressurize New Delhi periodically. We know that the
Tamil Nadu fishers are at fault, but we cannot afford to
antagonize Tamil Nadu, which has backed us for so long. 
(Srinivasan 2014:3) 
Many fishers privately complained about the elitist nature of the
TNA, yet felt that a full-fledged advocacy to embarrass the TNA
was not desired in order to keep up the appearance of a united
Tamil front against Colombo.
Reincorporating the excluded?
Although this article is not intended as a project evaluation, we
cannot avoid the question of whether the consortium succeeded
in helping northern Sri Lankan fishers improve their access to
fish resources. Convincing outcomes are limited because, by the
end of the project in 2016, Tamil Nadu trawl fishers still had a
relatively free run in Sri Lankan waters. Table 3 summarizes the
various strategies employed by the project and the various
obstacles it confronted.  
Despite these obstacles and setbacks, between 2010 and 2016, a
major shift occurred in the public discourse regarding the Palk
Bay fisheries conflict, both in India and Sri Lanka. At the
inception of the project in 2010, the Palk Bay fisheries issue in
India was predominantly framed as the Sri Lankan Navy
harassing Tamil Nadu fishers, so the Sri Lankan government was
largely forced into a defensive position; northern Sri Lankan
fishers figured nowhere in the discussion. In 2013, both the
vernacular and English media in Sri Lanka and India were
increasingly giving attention to the negative impacts of trawling
on northern Sri Lankan fishers, and governmental authorities in
the Northern Province and in Sri Lanka’s capital had become
more assertive about northern fishers’ rights. By 2016, the negative
impacts of trawlers were reluctantly acknowledged in India, and
the governments of both Tamil Nadu and India had started to
actually investigate options for restructuring the trawl fleet.
Although attribution problems are obvious, the final, external
project evaluation report concluded that the project likely made
important contributions to these developments (H. Dijkhorst
2016, unpublished report).
DISCUSSION
Conflict transformation from the bottom up?
We commenced by discussing the rationale for addressing
conflicts over access to natural resources through bottom-up
governance, which informed the REINCORPFISH project. The
notion of bottom-up governance emphasizes the importance of
creating ownership, participation, and collaboration and suggests
that, without engagement from fisher organizations, there can
neither be a fair and effective governance solution nor can fisher
conflicts be resolved.  
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In the authoritarian context of postwar Sri Lanka, several
challenges emerged from this approach. First, bottom-up
governance suggests that user groups and civil society can act as
initiators of change, with the state being at the receiving end. In
our case study, this normative notion was defied by evidence of
an extremely assertive government that was unreceptive, if  not
outright antagonistic, to civic agency. Although fishing practices
of nearshore fisheries typically attract little governmental
attention, in the transnational setting of the Palk Bay, fisheries
were closely entangled with the Sri Lankan state’s concerns of
security and sovereignty. These concerns also made the
government reluctant to endorse a form of track II diplomacy.  
Second, the postwar context and prevailing ethnic tensions
ensured strong state control over any activity in northern Sri
Lanka. Although the international members of the consortium
had expected a certain level of power politics, they had not
anticipated such intense levels of suspicion and political
interference. In the prevailing context, there was very little space
for bottom-up engagement unless it was conducted under the
patronage of cabinet-level politicians, military, or other
authorities, rendering notions of collaborative interaction and
participation rather elusive. In arriving at this conclusion, we do
not wish to suggest, however, that bottom-up governance is, in
general, an inoperable strategy, and neither does it disprove the
assumption that effective governance starts with fisher
involvement. However, these normative predispositions are of
little help to understand why such ideals are so difficult to
accomplish in practice.
Empowerment: between collaboration and confrontation
Our conceptual discussion highlighted two contrasting
approaches to empowerment. In the context of REINCORPFISH,
controversy manifested itself  both in terms of how and in relation
to whom fishers were supposed to be empowered. For the SLFU,
the project’s goals implied the creation of a social movement of
fishers who would fight for their legitimate rights. With both
Indian trawlers and the government compromising these rights,
this approach implied confrontations with Indian fishers, their
political supporters, and the Sri Lankan authorities. For others,
however, the project meant engaging fishers in creating a step-by-
step collaborative negotiation process both with Indian fishers
and the Sri Lankan authorities.  
Some project partners and fisher leaders were of the opinion that
the SLFU’s confrontational approach was counterproductive.
The fisher leader’s statement mentioned above illustrates that
bottom-up processes of empowerment can expose or deepen
existing vulnerabilities. Under authoritarian conditions, NGOs
are often not in the position to protect their “subjects” when the
going gets rough, leading to potentially risky situations. As a result
of the government’s outright suppression of the SLFU, not only
did the Alliance become marginalized, but also university
partners’ access to state officials also became blocked, thus
impeding a more negotiated approach.  
In terms of a constructive approach, however, it proved impossible
to simultaneously create a dialogue with the Sri Lankan
government and the trawl fishers from Tamil Nadu: The project’s
efforts to facilitate bilateral fisher dialogues were, after all, met
with the greatest suspicion by the Sri Lankan government.
Although an approach of working constructively with all parties
toward a negotiated solution may have been sensible from the
logic of a multistakeholder deliberation, in the context of
domestic ethnic tension and geopolitical swagger, any form of
empowerment of one actor with regard to another could only end
in a political hornet’s nest.  
As it turned out, the REINCORPFISH interventions also drew
flak from other, critical quarters in Sri Lanka. By 2015, a network
of activists had emerged that criticized the project for taking too
mild of an approach, i.e., dialogue, to the poaching Tamil Nadu
trawl population, for not making more use of available legal
options in Sri Lanka, and for its reluctance to frame trawler
intrusions as an act of Illegal Unregulated and Unreported (IUU)
fishing, thereby inviting international pressure. Whether these
critiques hold true is irrelevant for this paper; the point we are
aiming to make here is that by 2015, different parties proved to
have different ideas of who had to be empowered against whom,
for what purpose, and by what means.  
The tensions that emerge from theory between transformative
confrontational and revisionist approaches have thus been
apparent in practice. In particular, simultaneously employing
both approaches may work in mutually reinforcing ways but can
also create notable frictions. The action research approach also
made the theoretically useful dichotomy less clear-cut: efforts to
carefully facilitate interaction between stakeholders did bring
about some change, yet these changes were suddenly politicized
and lost in suspicion; efforts to mobilize fishers in demonstrations
were repressed at first, yet suddenly, interaction opened doors for
negotiations and brought about a shift in problem framings.
Civil society as an agent of change?
REINCORPFISH framed the conflict as an asymmetrical
struggle requiring a transformation process via bottom-up
governance, with civil society playing an important role as an
agent of change. The above discussion suggests that there were
two problems with this approach. The first issue relates to treating
civil society as a singular actor rather than as comprising diverse
actors and organizations with different and potentially competing
interests and accountabilities. Fishing communities in northern
Sri Lanka were too divided to represent a “unified fisher interest,”
and politicians, NGOs, concerned individuals, and academics
each claimed to represent the northern fishers in their own way.
Second, the project framing assumed that scientists and activists
would be able to perform the role of change agent to help fisher
communities in voicing and addressing their concerns. The
prevailing situation in Sri Lanka, however, offered extremely little
space for civil society to operate. The position of civil society vis-
à-vis the Sri Lankan state was heavily restricted, and the
opportunities to operate were too limited to assist fishers vis-à-
vis the Tamil Nadu trawl fishers and the Sri Lankan state. The
entrenchment of the fisheries conflict in bilateral and ethnic
politics and the suspicions of both governments toward third-
party mediation in what was viewed as an internal dispute further
marginalized the role of civil society actors. What our case
demonstrates is that neither can space for bottom-up processes
be assumed nor can the role of civil society as an agent of change.  
Although this observation could easily result in cynicism, a sense
of proportion is in place here. Since the two governments in
question were clearly unable or unwilling to address the injustice
prevailing in the Palk Bay, the project represented a strong effort
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to construct a collective intentionality among as many actors as
possible. Despite mounting obstacles, the regular collaboration
between academics, fisher leaders, clergy, journalists, and NGOs
succeeded in putting the injustice suffered by northern fishers on
the national public and political agenda. What the consortium
may have underestimated, however, were the level of internal
divisions and politics among Sri Lankan fishers and the sheer
reluctance of Tamil and Sinhalese elites to confront India on the
issue of transboundary fishing.  
Finally, the framing of the project as a fisheries conflict implied
a sectoral approach, which assumed that problems could be
tackled within the domain of fisheries. This perspective was, on
the one hand, logical, because the transboundary conflict was
clearly about fishing rights. On the other hand, it arguably failed
to foreground how northern Sri Lankan fishers’ marginality
resulted not only from poaching Indian trawlers but also from a
broader set of relations beyond the fisheries sector. Fishers
possess multiple identities, including caste, ethnicity, and
nationality, each of which produces its own marginalities that
cannot easily be understood through a sectoral approach. A
sectoral approach, in other words, is in danger of isolating an
issue from its wider contexts, ignoring the intersection of
structural conditions that create marginality at various levels (Li
2007).
CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed the efforts of a project to facilitate bottom-up
governance to transform a transboundary fisheries conflict in a
postwar setting, and identified a range of factors affecting the
potential for such transformation. The “transboundary” and
“postwar” qualifications are vital in order to understand the
challenges that were encountered. Transboundary resource
conflicts involve two or more governments, two navies, multiple
courts and ministries, and entangle fisheries with nationalist
anxieties of security, sovereignty, and geopolitical power play. In
the context of the REINCORPFISH project, these
entanglements implied that project dynamics in Sri Lanka greatly
depended upon political developments in Tamil Nadu and India
and vice versa. The powerful political support enjoyed by the trawl
fishers in Tamil Nadu impeded efforts to identify potentially
effective paths of engagement in Sri Lanka. In addition, the
political backlash against the project in Sri Lanka partly resulted
from the consortium’s efforts to simultaneously work in two
countries.  
The fact that REINCORPFISH was immediately initiated after
the civil war ended also played a decisive role. The Sri Lankan
state was in a victorious and militaristic frame of mind, suspicious
of any internal dissent and international involvement, and the
Tamil fishing population in the north was too vulnerable for
collective mobilization. Postwar interventions aimed at
revitalizing marginal livelihoods, especially in authoritarian
contexts, thus face a double problem: constructive efforts of
institutional capacity building might be distrusted for
undermining the state, while efforts at mobilizing communities to
challenge governmental authorities run the risk of strong
repression.  
This particular postwar, authoritarian, and transboundary
context arguably makes for an extreme case study, which does not
automatically allow for generalizing. Yet, such an extreme case
study can be particularly useful to expose limitations to concepts
like bottom-up governance, which may not be easily revealed in
more moderate contexts. For bottom-up engagement to work,
political space is required, whether invited by the state, claimed
by citizens through collective protest, or negotiated between the
two parties (Baud and Nainan 2008). In the absence of such
political space, actors can easily be turned against one another,
community leadership can be neutralized and civil society can be
squeezed. Interventions inspired by liberal notions of
empowerment, comanagement, and multistakeholder deliberation
may too readily assume that political space for bottom-up
engagement is available, thereby endangering not only their own
efforts but also the lives of the people they are actually aiming to
serve.  
The action research underlying this article entails an engaging
self-reflection, positioning ourselves both inside and outside the
intervention and thereby acting simultaneously as both subject
and object of research. Through the simultaneous practice of
research and action, action research allows for developing an
understanding not only through research but also through action
itself. In our case, transforming a fisheries conflict through action
research meant working through the multiplicity of coexisting
tensions (resource, ethnic, and geopolitical) that are frequently
studied in isolation. The notion that conflicts have multiple
dimensions challenges the inclination to work from a sectoral
perspective: a transformative agenda does not allow fisheries
conflicts to be separated from conflicts about ethnicity, caste, and
geopolitics. In action research, reducing reality’s messiness and
complexity can, thus, boomerang quite easily (Mathews 2011).
Yet paradoxically, acknowledging this entanglement of fisheries
conflicts with historically laden ethnic and geopolitical anxieties
also makes conflicts less intervenable.  
The final, overarching question to be raised is how critical analysis
can be combined with genuine efforts of transdisciplinary
consortia to transform conflicts for the benefit of marginal
groups. The rationale for such action is provided by Flyvbjerg’s
(2001) inquiry on “making social science matter” for which he
and others propose focusing on “tension points” (Flyvbjerg et al.
2012). This implies that social scientists should study issues in
which power relations “are particularly susceptible to
problematization and thus to change, because they are fraught
with dubious practices, contestable knowledge and potential
conflict. Thus, even a small challenge - like problematization from
scholars - may tip the scales and trigger change in a tension point”
(Flyvbjerg et al. 2012:288). We hope that the REINCORPFISH
project, despite its evident weaknesses, may have played a role of
this kind.
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